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 Executive summary 
Negotiators from different countries cannot be 
expected to agree on climate policy if 
researchers from those same countries cannot 
find common ground. Over the past two years, 
a unique international collaboration has 
brought together people from very different 
perspectives to explore possible ways forward 
after the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment 
period. While strong differences remain among 
individual members of the team, the points of 
agreement indicate a possible way forward for 
negotiations. This paper presents their current 
collective understanding. 
 
Ultimately, all members of the group are of the 
view that negotiations addressing greenhouse 
gas reduction commitments post-2012 should 
start immediately, as noted in the Kyoto 
Protocol. In addition, in the long run – say after 
2030, a lasting global solution will include 
three elements: (1) a cap-and-trade scheme; 
(2) an agreement for technology development; 
and (3) an assistance package for developing 
countries. However, there can be many 
different ways to reach the goal, and our views 
on their feasibility and effectiveness are 
divided.  
 
One way is to continue the efforts started at 
Kyoto and to broaden and deepen the current 
absolute, binding caps. Several ideas to 
envisage this are debated. This approach 
assumes that countries have the necessary 
political will and that international agreements 
have the teeth necessary to make real change.  
 
Another way to get there is to focus on 
creating an “enabling environment” for a cap-
and-trade regime through technology and 
development cooperation. Even if effectively 
implemented, emissions trading alone will not 
be sufficient to achieve radical emissions cuts. 
Emissions trading may also be politically 
unacceptable in some countries, particularly in 
the short term. Be it ex ante or ex post to a 
cap-and-trade regime, development and 
transfer of technologies will be critical. This 
could also mean that countries not yet ready to 
commit themselves to binding targets can 
become active participants in the climate 
regime through reframing climate issues so 
that they become embedded in countries’ 
other national priorities. Such developments 
may be a more effective way of ensuring that 
the climate regime will be economically and 
environmentally effective in the long run.  
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These two strategies, named “Cap First” and 
“Empower First” are summarized in Figure 1. 
They may either be mutually reinforcing or 
conflicting. Caution is necessary to ensure that 
technology and development cooperation does 
not dilute political attention to climate change, 
and that the cap-and-trade regime does not 
cripple technology and development 
cooperation by creating an adversarial 
negotiation atmosphere.  
 
While this team understands that integrating 
climate change considerations into the 
economic development and poverty 
eradication priorities of developing countries is 
critical to ensuring effective global 
engagement on climate change, it also 
recognizes that the willingness to pay by 
developed countries would be insufficient to 
induce developing countries to choose less 
carbon-intensive development paths 
immediately. However, development 
assistance, with modifications, could catalyze 
other financial resources and enable 
developing countries to take further actions 
themselves. 
Introduction 
The Kyoto Protocol under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) is an important first step in the 
development of a truly global climate regime. 
Through the Kyoto Protocol, the climate 
change regime covers a range of gases, as 
well as emissions from all economic sectors, 
leading to linkages of multilateral discussions 
on energy, transportation, forestry, agriculture 
and broader issues related to trade and 
investment.  
 
Further, once it comes into force in 2005, the 
importance of Kyoto over the long term is not 
the specific targets or number of Annex B 
Parties in the agreement, but that it has set 
the stage for international discussions on the 
issue. An important aspect of the current 
agreement is that it has helped assign an 
international market value to carbon. Carbon 
emissions now carry a price tag, and will 
continue to carry one in the post-2012 world.  
 
That said, it must also be recognized that the 
regime will look markedly different than what 
was originally intended, mainly due to the 
decision of the US to opt out. And there is no 
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indication that the US is willing to return to the 
Kyoto fold anytime soon. For future 
negotiations, views are sharply divided 
between, and among, developed and 
developing countries on the issue of burden-
sharing. While the Kyoto Protocol calls for 
another negotiation round beginning from 
2005 to set further targets beyond 2012, 
countries may consider alternatives to the 
current framework, particularly if the world’s 
largest emitter refuses to re-engage in the 
Kyoto process. 
 
In the first phase of this two-year project, we 
developed a range of scenarios that countries 
may wish to consider for a post-2012 
framework, illustrating the many possible 
futures under which the global climate regime 
may evolve. The scenarios include Graduation 
and Deepening, the strengthening of a 
binding-cap approach under UNFCCC, 
Converging Markets, the bottom-up evolution 
of emission markets on global scale, Orchestra 
of Treaties, a regime consisting of multiple 
treaties among like-minded countries, and 
Human Development, a regime with emphasis 
on equity among people in the world.  
 
In the past year, we have continued to 
elaborate three key issues that were identified 
in the first phase of the project. They include 
the future of a binding-cap regime under the 
UNFCCC, promotion of technology, and 
development assistance.  
 
This paper first presents a number of ideas on 
how to broaden the current binding cap regime, 
including a proposal from our developing-
country member of the team with emphasis 
on social equity. Second, the role of 
technology is discussed. Lessons from past 
successes are explored with a view to 
developing options for their most effective use 
over the near future. Last, the issue of financial 
flows to developing countries is discussed, 
including the issue of mainstreaming 
assistance for climate-change response. 
Advancing the current cap-
and-trade regime 
Many policymakers feel that a new protocol 
under the UNFCCC, with binding targets and 
the same flexible instruments as in the Kyoto 
Protocol, would be the most effective structure 
for establishing a framework to control and 
reduce global greenhouse gas emissions. 
However, in order to move towards such a 
framework, negotiations will have to overcome 
significant and entangled barriers, including re-
engaging the USA, establishing commitments 
for developing countries that are stronger than 
those in the Kyoto Protocol, establishing new 
emission targets, and breaking the current 
stalemate. While the UNFCCC and the Kyoto 
Protocol themselves provide precedents for 
moving forward while keeping Kyoto’s core 
architecture intact, it is also true that there are 
severe challenges to overcome the barriers 
present in the current framework. 
 
There are several potential modifications to the 
Kyoto Mechanisms that can be considered for 
a future framework, including: a procedure for 
allowing allowances from non-party trading 
schemes to be used for compliance; sector 
targets for developing countries; expanding the 
scope of Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) investments to cover sectoral, 
subnational, and/or policy-based activities; 
target-setting for sectors or whole economies 
as reductions from estimated baselines, 
approved by an international review team; and 
additional eligibility criteria for CDM host 
countries. In order to break the current 
stalemate, it will be important that some 
parties show leadership. A coalition of 
likeminded countries, notably those that 
already have introduced market-based 
mechanisms, might show leadership by 
presenting a mandate or plan for the future 
negotiation process, and proposing an 
allocation for these countries for the period 
after 2012. To be effective, this coalition, like 
any groups seeking to take on another form of 
leadership role, should lead by uniting, not 
dividing the world.  
 
We also note the potential for using other 
negotiation arenas for furthering cooperation 
on climate, both within G8 and G20. Limiting 
the number of negotiating parties will help to 
more rapidly advance action on issues of 
common concern to major developed and 
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developing countries. It will, however, be 
important to include all major emitters in these 
discussions, both from the developed and the 
developing world. Looking at complementary 
agendas will also be critical, both on the 
demand and supply side of emission quota. 
For instance, serious efforts should be made 
to understand and discuss climate change in 
the context of overall global energy security, 
since clean energy forms are increasingly 
associated with enhancing energy security. 
Re-engaging the US 
Ironically, the Kyoto Protocol is essentially a US 
construct, and a US Administration that is 
serious about climate change is likely to 
support a similar framework. However, even if 
the administration is positive, it is still 
questionable whether the US Senate will ratify. 
The US may begin implementing a national cap 
and trade system, for example for the utility 
sector, but will be unable to ratify a treaty like 
Kyoto, at least until  it is made clear when 
developing countries will be willing to take on 
their own commitments. In addition, US 
participation in an international agreement 
would be predicated on implementation of the 
necessary domestic policy measures, a 
development that could take some time. 
 
To allow active US participation in case the 
Senate does not ratify the Kyoto Protocol or a 
successor agreement, the climate regime may 
need to develop a procedure by which the 
COP/MOP could permit allowances from non-
parties’ trading systems to be used for 
compliance, so long as those systems could 
be monitored to ensure the same quality as 
the overall international regime. It would also 
be worthwhile for the COP/MOP to consider 
allowing non-parties to participate in the 
governing institutions of the protocol, e.g. the 
CDM Executive Board. 
 
Such developments could make it possible for 
a future US administration to link a domestic 
US trading scheme to the international trading 
system without ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol. Under such circumstances, the US 
would be able to comply with its obligations 
under a protocol with the full use of the 
flexible mechanisms, even if it has not ratified. 
At the same time, if the necessary domestic 
policy measures are indeed in place in the US, 
this would provide an incentive for a full-
fledged accession to the international 
framework.  
Acceptable and predictable targets 
In terms of targets, the Kyoto Protocol has two 
major problems: the target-setting was 
arbitrary and unpredictable, and the targets 
turned out to be immensely skewed. Some 
countries, such as Russia, had very ‘lax’ 
targets while others, such as the US, Canada 
and Japan, took on targets that were far 
beyond their ability to make through domestic 
actions alone. Greater predictability would 
make it easier to develop long-term policies 
which can facilitate more effective goal-
achievement. Such predictability will also be 
key to involve the business community, which 
seeks a predictable and acceptable framework. 
A model for guiding target-setting could be 
helpful, although, of course, politics will always 
play a role in such negotiations.  
 
Still, it is worth considering whether a simple 
and transparent model could be used for 
developing fair targets in the post-2012 period. 
To this end, we have elaborated formulae for 
setting targets as reductions from baselines as 
a way to guide the establishment of Assigned 
Amounts. Establishing baselines for countries 
may be technically easier than in Kyoto, as all 
Annex B Parties, including Eastern European 
countries, Russia and the Ukraine, will have 
registries and inventory systems. Still it seems 
likely that baselines will be inflated, as 
witnessed in the EU’s National Allocation Plan 
process, and this will have to be factored in.  
 
Whether the countries will agree upon such 
formulae is dependent on political will. Such 
will is not likely to coalesce immediately, but 
discussions about formulae would provide the 
basis for negotiating burden sharing and, 
eventually, possible agreement in the long run.  
Breaking the stalemate 
In order to break the current stalemate in 
international negotiations, many parties must 
show leadership. But leadership can have 
different forms. 
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A group of countries could show leadership by 
stating that it is unilaterally willing to take on a 
weak target (e.g., 10% from baseline) 
regardless of the positions of other countries, 
but that it is prepared to take on stronger 
targets if other Annex I countries take on 
targets, or if developing countries take on 
sectoral or other types of targets. COP 11 may 
be a natural time to announce such unilateral 
targets. The process could benefit from 
experience with tariff concession rounds in 
international trade negotiations seeking to 
reduce the level of trade barriers. Furthermore, 
such an initiative could lead to a draft mandate 
for a process that would lead to a new protocol 
under the UNFCCC for the period after 2012. 
 
A weak unilateral target from a group of 
likeminded countries would be enough to keep 
the Kyoto institutions (barely) alive without 
hurting national competitiveness if they have 
to go it alone. But the main idea is that it could 
maintain the dynamics created by the Kyoto 
Protocol, and would make it difficult for other 
countries to do nothing. When other countries 
propose targets, the cap-and-trade leadership 
coalition could increase its own target, and 
hence create a “race to the top”.  
 
Without a supportive US, however, the best 
the cap-and-trade coalition could hope for 
would be to develop the institutional 
framework, establish new and weak targets 
for the rest of the OECD, and possibly involve 
a few advanced developing countries.  
 
Even with limited participation and weak 
targets, it would be important that the climate 
regime maintain the cap-and-trade systems so 
that the institution would develop and the 
environmental effectiveness of the approach 
would be demonstrated, thus convincing other 
countries to follow suit. 
Equitable target setting 
may secure global 
participation  
The developing country member of the team 
developed a proposal seeking to show a 
possible international climate change 
framework that focuses on social equity. Since 
it is the most detailed formula of burden 
sharing proposed by developing country 
experts, we believe it is worthwhile to present 
the core ideas in detail. 
 
The detailed indicators used for the setting of 
differentiated commitments in the proposal 
should be seen as illustrative, and we are 
aware that countries do not possess political 
will to immediately agree upon the equity 
based formula. However, insight into the 
thinking in important developing countries will 
be crucial to constructing a truly effective 
climate regime.  
 
Individual countries are at different stages of 
development. If equity is taken seriously, a 
logical and rational approach to emissions 
reductions should be based on countries’ 
respective levels of development, and their 
commitments linked to responsibility, potential 
and capability to mitigate. Some commitments 
can be voluntary, some obligatory while others 
should be conditional. For developing countries 
to participate, emissions commitments will 
have to take into account development needs 
as well as technological and financial resources 
transferred from the developed world. Large 
developing countries, like China, in joining any 
agreement will naturally argue that the 
principle of common but differentiated 
commitments must be well reflected in the 
framework. For instance, developed countries 
would have to lead in reducing GHG emissions 
and demonstrating that mitigation actions are 
consistent with economic development. 
 
To be both fair and reflective of national 
circumstances, six groups of countries can be 
differentiated in terms of their development 
and emissions status. Some of these 
indicators are given in Table 1. 
 
To be equitable, commitments have to be 
linked to these development stages. In order 
to foster implementation one can choose to 
use both carrots and sticks. However, in most 
cases it will not be fruitful to use sticks at the 
multilateral level in order to include developing 
countries in environmental treaties, as a party 
has a choice to withdraw from commitments. 
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Therefore, incentives to developing countries 
play a more important and crucial role in 
implementation of the commitments. These 
incentives can take the form of e.g. emissions 
trading with generous targets for developing 
countries, or a progressive tax on emissions 
that reflects the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities.  
 
Some practical problems with this approach 
would have to be worked out. Dividing 
countries into categories may prove easier 
than differentiating and implementing their 
actual commitments. The problem of broader 
participation is analogous to the “chicken and 
egg” issue. In the case of commitments under 
Kyoto, developing countries argue that OECD 
nations should take the lead on actions and 
reduction targets, while OECD countries argue 
that if they ‘lead’ too aggressively, they will 
lose their competitive positions to other 
economies that do not have to take on targets. 
Both viewpoints need to be considered in a 
balanced way in developing an effective post-
2012 commitments regime, and taking into 
account the rule of common but differentiated 
commitments. It should be pointed out that 
both groups of countries are far from 
homogenous, and that there are great 
differences between OECD countries as well 
as within the groups of developing countries. 
In order to create a framework that respects 
different countries needs and abilities we may 
identify small steps that can be taken in this 
direction, analogous to the “confidence-
building” measures used in arms negotiations. 
Table 1. Indicative indicators used to set equitable targets for global participation 
 
GHG/cap, 
2000 
Cumulative 
emissions, 
1990-2000 
GDP/cap, 
2000  
Stages  (t-CO2e) (Gt-CO2e) (‘000 US$) Commitments 
Annex II 15.9 134.9 27.5 
Binding (strict) absolute reduction targets,  
domestic reduction, high direct payments to non-Annex I
Annex I, but 
not Annex II 
10.0 95.4 7.0 
Absolute limitation or reduction targets,  
domestic reduction,* 
qualitative commitments  
some financial transfers from Annex II  
NICs 12.0 92.3 10.4 
Binding absolute reduction targets, domestic reduction, 
low / no payments to non-Annex I  
RIDCs 4.3 27.4 5.0 
Absolute limitation targets (conditional to funding),* 
qualitative commitments , 
direct payments from Annex II 
IgDCs 2.1 10.1 2.6 
No quantified commitments, 
qualitative commitments, 
direct payments from Annex II 
LDCs 1.5 1.4 1.2 
No quantified commitments, 
qualitative commitments,  
direct payments from Annex II 
 
N.B. The figures in the table are group averages. There exists large variations in one group. Cumulative emissions 
1990-2000 may be controversial, but for simplicity, the Kyoto base year 1990 is chosen as the starting year. GDP 
numbers are in PPP (based on Ott et al., 2004). 
Groups of countries: Annex II—highly developed (fully industrialized with a tendency to de-industrialize, no 
physical expansion of the economy) countries; Annex I but not Annex II—fully industrialized, no physical expansion 
of the economy; newly industrialized countries (NICs)—limited need for further physical expansion of the 
economy; rapidly industrializing countries (RIDs)—rapid physical expansion of the economy; Industrializing 
counties (IgDCs)—physical expansion of the economy; and least developed countries (LDCs)—limited physical 
expansion of the economy at the current stage. 
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Promoting climate 
technology development 
Why technology?  
A cap and trade regime alone will not be 
enough to induce the technological innovation 
instrumental to prevent climate change in the 
long term. The price signal created by the 
carbon market is currently between 5 and 10 € 
per tonne of CO2 and it is politically difficult to 
raise this much higher. At this level, the price 
signal may foster short-term emission cuts 
using existing technologies, but it by no means 
represents a high enough price to justify 
significant R&D investments in nascent 
technologies. Hence, it is necessary to 
develop additional policies that will enhance 
technology development and deployment.  
 
A distinctive opportunity lies in international 
cooperation on technology. If we can 
successfully reframe the climate issue as the 
promotion of technologies, there may be more 
chances for countries to mobilize a large 
amount of resources towards preventing 
climate change. The current US Administration, 
for example, has made it clear that it will 
emphasize technology in fighting greenhouse 
gas emissions. 
Technology cooperation treaties? 
We investigated existing energy technology 
cooperation treaties in general. There have 
been some success stories on basic R&D such 
as particle physics and grand circulation 
models for climate change research. Also, 
there have been some successes in sharing 
information from demonstration projects or 
other core data, such as Implementation 
Agreements coordinated by the International 
Energy Agency. However, it is difficult to point 
to a particular technological innovation fully 
attributable to such international cooperation. 
International frameworks have been helpful, 
but only in a catalytic role and not as drivers of 
technological innovation itself. The literature 
also points to many governmental failure, 
particularly technology demonstration projects 
in developing countries. Lessons must be 
developed from these experiences to ensure 
that the failures of the past are not repeated. 
International interplay of technology 
and institutions 
Knowing the limit of formal international 
technology treaties, we investigated the 
informal interplay of technologies and 
institutions across countries. Case studies 
included automobile pollutant emissions and 
stationary SOx regulation in developed 
countries in the 1970s and 80s, and wind-
power development in Europe in the 1990s. 
 
There are four main findings. First, 
technological innovation takes place mainly at 
the national or regional levels by the interaction 
among private and public sectors, and rarely 
through formal global treaties.1 The historical 
patterns of technological innovation reflect the 
diversity of resource endowments and political 
salience of issues among countries.  
 
Second, informal interplay of technologies and 
institutions are more important than formal 
international agreements. In most cases, once 
a technology is marketable in a country, it is 
only a matter of time before it is diffused to 
the rest of the world. 
 
Third, creation of niche markets for nascent 
technologies are key to fostering innovation, 
and one or two economically powerful 
countries or regions are usually sufficient to 
create a critical mass for innovation. 
Furthermore, US experience has shown that 
regulation of one large submarket can catalyze 
uniform regulation across national markets, as 
when California led the introduction of US auto 
emissions standards and appliance efficiency 
standards. 
 
Interestingly, many successful “niche 
markets” have been created by non-market 
policy instruments. For example, the niche 
markets for automobile emission cut 
technologies were created by direct regulation. 
Wind power niche markets in many European 
                                                 
1 While technology was an important part in the creation of 
the Montreal Protocol, it was rather a case of available 
technology making international cooperation possible, 
rather than international effort driving technology 
development. 
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countries were created by subsidies. These 
successful policies incorporated stable and 
strong support for specific technologies. It is to 
be seen if emerging niche markets created by 
market policy instruments such as Renewable 
Portfolio Standards (RPS) are similarly effective. 
“Catch-all” GHG emission markets, if they are 
characterized by fluctuating and weak price 
signals, would not be helpful for such 
technological development. 
 
Fourth, many international interplays of 
technologies and institutions have been 
successful, and there are also some success 
stories of intentionally enhancing this interplay 
through international coordination. Examples 
include the Collaborative Labeling and 
Appliance Standards Program (CLASP) and 
Promoting an Energy-Efficient Public Sector 
(PEPS) networks, which promote energy 
conservation as a common agenda among 
countries. Promoting such international 
arrangement to enhance technological and 
institutional interplay across countries, with 
mutual recognition of such activities, will 
contribute to the development of innovative 
technologies. 
 
. 
International division of labor for 
climate technology  
The findings suggest that there is an 
opportunity for treaties among regional or like-
minded partners to create niche markets for 
technologies in their mutual national interests. 
Their technological choices may differ 
depending on their respective resource 
endowments and political concerns. Examples 
include cooperation on energy conservation 
among China, Japan, and other Asian countries, 
geological carbon storage among major fossil-
fuel producers such as US, Canada, Norway, 
Australia, Russia and Saudi Arabia, and wind 
power among EU and other countries (Figure 
2). Once technologies are developed in niche 
markets and the costs are brought down, they 
will diffuse to the rest of world through the 
international interplay of technologies and 
institutions. A complementary global 
framework may play a role in legitimizing these 
activities, to let them recognize each other, 
and to maintain high political salience  
The role of development 
assistance and investment 
flows 
Over the last ten to fifteen years of 
negotiations covering both the UNFCCC and 
the Kyoto Protocol, two things have become 
increasingly evident. First, development 
assistance and overall investment flows to 
developing countries will play a critical part in 
laying the foundation for any active global 
regime on climate change. Second, however, 
there has been very little progress in reaching 
any satisfactory agreements on these very 
same issues, particularly as they relate to 
technology transfer and addressing the 
 
Wind 
- Wind rich countries
- JREC etc
Carbon Capture
- Fossil fuel rich countries
- CSLF etc
Energy Efficiency
- Countries with fragile access to 
energy and efficient economy
- APEC etc
Figure 2. Illustrative 
example of 
international division 
of labor. Countries 
create niche markets 
according to their 
national interests.
Note: JREC: Johannesburg Renewable Energy Coalition; CSLF: Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum; APEC: Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperatioon 
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impacts of and actions on climate change.  
 
The roots of the problem lay in the 
contradiction between overall levels of ODA 
funds, which have been declining for 20 years, 
and rising obligations to provide ODA. The 
commitments laid out in the Convention and 
the Protocol appear to many, particularly in the 
NGO and developing country communities, to 
formally oblige OECD countries to ‘bankroll’ 
climate-change-related activities in addition to 
the financing they are already providing 
through ODA. Moreover, it is unlikely that we 
will see any strong reversal in the decline in 
total ODA funding, even accounting for 
climate-change-related activities. The result has 
been an acrimonious negotiating dynamic with 
not much hope for reaching a satisfactory 
resolution on either side. 
 
Nor has the issue of climate change been 
effectively integrated in the mainstream 
activities of development agencies. Developing 
countries have, for the most part, not identified 
climate change as an issue of concern to 
development agencies. A number of analyses 
have indicated that, while there have been 
some successful initiatives, particularly those 
related to supporting G-77 and China in their 
National Communications and, to a lesser 
extent, helping them develop National 
Adaptation Strategies, these successes have 
not spread into “normal” technical assistance. 
In other words, the strong linkages that do 
exist between the threat of climate change 
and poverty eradication and development are 
still not appreciated at the field level.  
 
A challenge on the donor side is to engage 
finance and development planners effectively 
in the climate policy discussion, whereas 
recipients have to acknowledge that new 
funds can only be harnessed if their use is 
likely to be more effective than in the past. 
While developing countries have, for the most 
part, not identified climate change as an issue 
of concern to development agencies, in 
negotiating forums they have been badgering 
OECD countries for significant new and 
additional funds as a quid pro quo for 
cooperation on climate change. There are ways 
to fix these issues in ODA, and countries are 
finally beginning to try and fix them. For 
example, there is an increasing number of 
initiatives looking at the issues of climate and 
development together (as the Brundtland 
report and many others since have advocated), 
and looking to engage finance and 
development planners in those discussions. 
 
The mainstreaming of climate issues with 
development priorities means paying more 
attention to the ‘co-benefits’ of climate 
mitigation and local environments, integration 
of mitigation and adaptation at project and 
policy levels, realizing that in many respects, 
they can be complementary drivers. It also 
means broadening the scope of current market 
mechanisms, such as JI and the CDM, to 
cover sectoral, policy, and sub-national 
initiatives. It could also mean finding ways to 
include developing countries in emissions, or 
allowance-based, trading.  
 
However, it is necessary to be cautious when 
addressing the challenge of mainstreaming. 
On both sides there are concerns that climate-
change response is in competition with other 
development objectives for funding. Recipient 
nations are worried that existing aid budgets 
will be cut in order to fund the solution to a 
“developed country” problem, as the 
argument came to the fore during the 
negotiation of use of ODA for CDM. Since 
current ODA projects are targeted at areas that 
directly or indirectly support climate-change 
response, there could be ways to resolve 
these concerns in a constructive manner.  
 
Still, even if these issues are resolved, ODA 
alone brings a limited benefit in the end. The  
opportunities for large-scale activities that will 
be significant in terms of mitigating climate 
change lie with private investment, including 
CDM in a structure that is more effective than 
its current overly bureaucratic state. Where 
progress really has to be made, and where it 
will make a difference, is in the maturation of 
these market opportunities and broadening 
participation through incentive-based 
mechanisms. This will not be easy. An 
immediate barrier is the limited willingness to 
pay by the developed countries. Our case 
studies for the existing international 
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environmental financial assistance showed 
that financial flows of more than a billion 
dollars have been extremely difficult to agree 
upon and to implement. It is not certain that 
developed countries will agree to and 
implement any scheme that finances the 
“additional” reductions that could easily sum 
up to several billion dollars annually. Things can 
move forward, but only if countries are open to 
being innovative. 
 
Surely ODA and private financial resources can 
play effective complementary roles, with ODA 
focusing on capacity building and policy 
cooperation, while private funding could focus 
on project-level technology demonstration.  
 
Finally, it is critical that attention be paid to 
domestic implementation mechanisms and 
priorities. In particular, institutionalization of 
climate-change issues in domestic government 
agencies would effectively create “champions” 
for mitigation and adaptation within 
governments of developing countries. This is a 
crucial step that would build a constituency for 
action, and help give domestic and foreign 
businesses and NGOs reliable points of 
contact to engage government on climate 
change.  
 
It also means much more effective co-
ordination between aid agencies and 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and 
enhanced coherence, in turn, with the FDI 
flows to developing countries.  And finally, 
above all, for OECD countries, it means 
showing leadership at home. OECD countries 
must demonstrate that they are taking 
significant actions at home to mitigate climate 
change and that it is not compromising their 
economic objectives. Until developing 
countries can see that this is in fact the case, 
the prospects for bringing them aboard will 
always be challenging.   
Concluding remarks 
In the two-year project, four alternative 
scenarios for a future climate regime have 
been presented at workshops on three 
continents by a global partnership of 
researchers. Three key issues, i.e., extension 
of the cap-and-trade approach, focusing 
agreements on technology, and the role 
development assistance, have been analysed 
in detail. The authors hope that their efforts 
have contributed to setting the scene for 
policymakers and stakeholders to debate and 
make decisions. 
 
The story is told that when two disciples asked 
Confucius if they should immediately do what 
they thought to be good, he answered, “Yes, 
do it,” to the timid one and, “No, consult your 
father first,” to the arrogant one. He always 
gave different answers to different disciples 
based upon his analysis of their characters. In 
our view, the Kyoto Protocol is a significant 
first, bold step. The wiser second step should 
now be undertaken with careful analysis of the 
characteristics of the myriad alternative paths 
for international climate policy. 
 
This project has gone some way down that 
road. Our starting point was that we saw that 
the international climate negotiations were 
facing high and maybe fatal barriers; the risk 
for stalemate was – and still is - imminent. 
Hence, in the first year of the project we boldly 
set out to investigate possible scenarios for 
the future development climate regime. In the 
second year we have devoted our time and 
energy to spell out in greater detail the 
implementation of the regimes described in 
these scenarios. 
 
Within a couple of decades, nations will have 
to reach the goal of an all-inclusive climate 
policy framework. This will require a climate 
institutional design which includes cap and 
trade, technology development, and an 
assistance package. While these issues are 
already addressed in the Kyoto Protocol to a 
certain extent, there are needs for institutional 
improvement or innovation, either within or out 
of the Kyoto type architecture. Our research 
has identified several alternative steps that will 
help us towards this goal, and we hope our 
findings can provide input to the coming 
negotiations on the future of the climate 
regime.  
About the authors 
Taishi Sugiyama is the Leader of Climate 
Policy Project at the Central Research Institute 
Where to next? Future steps of the global climate regime 
 11
of Electric Power Industry (CRIEPI), Japan. He 
is a member of Future Framework Committee 
that makes recommendation to Japanese 
government on post-2012 issues. He serves as 
a member of the IPCC 4th Assessment Report, 
and Scientific Steering Committee of the 
International Human Dimension Program 
(IHDP)/ Institutional Dimensions of Global 
Environmental Change (IDGEC). He also 
serves as a member of the Future Framework 
Committee that made recommendation on 
Post-2012 framework to the Japanese 
government. He has also served to Small 
Scale CDM Panel of Executive Board of CDM. 
in 2002. E-mail: sugiyama@criepi.denken.or.jp 
 
Kristian Tangen is the CEO of Point Carbon 
and Associate Fellow at the Fridtjof Nansen 
Institute (FNI), Norway. He is recognised as a 
leading international expert in the field of 
climate change policy, and has in-depth 
knowledge of the international negotiation 
process, domestic policies, and the 
distributional effects of implementation of 
climate change related policies. His current 
research focuses in particular on the use of the 
flexibility mechanisms in climate change 
policies. He has published several articles and 
books on climate policies in Russia and China, 
and is an active participant in several networks 
on international climate change policy research. 
Through Point Carbon Kristian holds a finger on 
the pulse of the international carbon markets, 
and his insight into the functioning of these 
markets is unequalled.  
 
Axel Michaelowa is head of the Programme 
for International Climate Policy at the Hamburg 
Institute of International Economics, Germany. 
He has been doing research on international 
flexibility mechanisms in climate policy for the 
last decade and has published more than 50 
articles and studies, commissioned by inter 
alia the UNFCCC Secretariat, UNDP, UNEP, the 
German Federal Government and the German 
Agency of Technical Cooperation. He is a lead 
author for the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, 
active in German capacity development for the 
Clean Development Mechanism in major host 
countries (India, Indonesia and China) and 
serves as reviewer of baseline methodologies 
for the CDM Executive Board. Moreover, he 
has been looking at the role of interest groups 
on the different levels of climate policy, 
particularly the EU. Since COP 1 (1995), he has 
participated as a UN- accredited observer 
(NGO) at the international climate negotiations, 
regularly organizing side events, and disposes 
over numerous contacts in governmental 
delegations, NGOs and enterprises. 
 
Jiahua Pan is Senior Fellow and Executive 
Director of the Research Centre for 
Sustainable Development at the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), China. He 
has published extensively on the economics of 
sustainable development and climate change 
issues. He is a co-editor of IPCC’s Third 
Assessment Report on Climate Change 
Mitigation. He has been involved in IPCC AR4 
(4th Assessment report on climate change) 
scooping meetings and a lead author of AR4 
chapter on sustainable development and 
mitigation, UNFCCC expert meetings on 
climate change mitigation, UNFCCC review of 
national communications, and World Bank 
project on China CDM Studies. His 
understanding of human development needs 
brings a crucial developing country perspective. 
Recent projects at CASS include a UDDP study 
on China CDM policy issues and further 
development of post-Kyoto Scenario of human 
development with emphasis on quantitative 
understandings.  
 
Henrik Hasselknippe is Senior Analyst at Point 
Carbon and Associate Fellow at the Fridtjof 
Nansen Institute (FNI), Norway. He has 
conducted research in the field of energy and 
environment since 1997 and on international 
climate change policy since 1999. His main 
research focus is on the future climate regime, 
in particular the development of emission 
trading markets and the policy steps needed to 
link these markets. Through his work at Point 
Carbon he has considerable insight into the 
global carbon markets and their functioning. 
Besides contributing to single chapters, 
Hasselknippe has acted as the coordinator for 
the project.  
 
John Drexhage is Director of the Climate 
Change and Energy Program with the 
International Institute for Sustainable 
Sugiyama, Tangen, Hasselknippe, Michaelowa, Drexhage, Pan, Sinton and Moe (2004) 
 12
Development, based in Canada. He was a 
senior negotiator with the Canadian 
government on climate change for some six 
years, focusing on the Kyoto Mechanisms. 
Having joined IISD in 2001, Mr. Drexhage 
focuses his time on domestic implementation 
issues, the Kyoto Mechanisms, post-Kyoto 
regimes and vulnerabilities of developing 
countries to the impacts of climate change, 
particularly in Africa. 
 
Jonathan Sinton is a Scientist with the 
Environmental Energy Technologies Division of 
the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, 
USA, which he joined in 1990. He has worked 
on a range of interdisciplinary topics, mainly 
collaborative efforts with researchers in Asia, 
on energy and environmental policy, from 
energy efficiency to climate change to rural 
household stoves, with a particular focus on 
China (http://china.lbl.gov).  
 
Arild Moe is Deputy Director at the Fridtjof 
Nansen Institute (FNI) in Norway. In addition to 
studies on climate change policies Arild has 
extensive insight into aspects of the Russian 
energy sector, in particular the oil and gas 
industry and the reorganisation of these 
industries.  
Acknowledgements 
This project has benefited greatly from the 
input of many individuals around the world. We 
would especially like to thank the enthusiastic 
audience at the workshops we have carried 
out. Without their input our work would have 
been poorer. We also thank CRIEPI and the 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for 
providing funding for the project. 
More information 
We would especially like to direct your 
attention to the forthcoming special issue of 
the journal International Environmental 
Agreements entitled “Scenarios for the Global 
Climate Regime”, where we publish findings 
from our project. The journal is planned for 
release in early 2005. 
 
For further questions and information on 
coming publications, please contact: 
 
Henrik Hasselknippe  
Senior Analyst, Point Carbon 
Email: hha@pointcarbon.com 
References  
Banuri, T., Weyant, J., Akum, G., Najam, A., 
Rosa, L., Rayner, S., Sachs, W., Sharma, R., 
Yohe, G.: 2001, Setting the stage: climate 
change and sustainable development. In Metz, 
B., Davidson, O., Swart, R. and Pan, J. (eds.) 
Climate Change 2001: mitigation. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. Pp.73-114. 
 
Baumert, K. A. (editor): 2002, Hoehne, N 
Building on the Kyoto Protocol: options for 
protecting the climate. World Resources 
Institute, October 2002. 
 
Collaborative Labeling and Appliance 
Standards Program(CLASP): 2004, Standards 
and Labels Online Information Clearinghouse – 
The CLASP website,  
<http://www.clasponline.org/main.php3>. 
 
Gallagher, K. S.: 2001, “US-China Energy 
Cooperation – A Review of Joint Activities 
Related to Chinese Energy Development Since 
1980”, BCSIA Discussion Paper 2001-21, 
Energy Technology Innovation Project, Kennedy 
School of Government, Harvard University.  
 
Hoehne, N., Galleguillos, C., Blok, K., Harnisch, 
J., and Phylipsen, D. : 2003, Evolution of 
Commitments under the UNFCCC: involving 
newly industrialised economies and developing 
countries, ECOFYS GmbH, on behalf of the 
German Federal Environmental Agency. 
February 2003. 
 
IEA (International energy Agency): 2003: CO2 
Emissions from Fuel Combustion, 1971 – 2001. 
Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (2003 edition). 
 
IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change): 2000. Special Report on Emissions 
Scenarios. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.  
 
Michaelowa, Axel (2004): The German wind 
energy lobby, HWWA Discussion Paper No. 
Where to next? Future steps of the global climate regime 
 13
296, Hamburg Institute of International 
Economics. 
 
Ott, H E, Winkler, H, Brouns, B, Kartha, S, 
Mace, M, Huq, S, Kameyama, Y, Sari, A P, Pan, 
J, Sokona, Y, Bhandari, P M, Kassenberg, A, 
La Rovere, E L & Rahman, A 2004. South-
North dialogue on equity in the greenhouse. A 
proposal for an adequate and equitable global 
climate agreement. Eschborn, GTZ. 
 
Pan, J.: 2002, ‘An analytical framework for 
human development, with empirical data’, 
Social Sciences in China, No. 6 (in Chinese), pp. 
9–17. 2002.  
 
Pan, J.: 2003, ‘Emissions rights and their 
transferability: equity concerns over climate 
change mitigation’, International Environmental 
Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 
2003 vol .3(1): pp. 1–16. 
 
Ohshita, S. B. : 2002, Japan’s Cleaner Coal 
Technology Transfer to China: The 
Implementation of MITI’s Green Aid Plan, Ph. 
D Dissertation. 
 
Promoting an Energy-efficient Public Sector 
(PePS): 2004, The PePS website, 
<http://www.pepsonline.org/>. 
 
Sugiyama, Tangen, Michaelowa, Pan and 
Hasselknippe, 2003. Scenarios for the Global 
Climate Regime. Briefing paper. 
http://www.fni.no/post2012/briefing_paper.pdf  
 
Sugiyama et.al. 2005: Scenarios for the Global 
Climate Reime. International Environmental 
Agreements Special Issue. 
 
Zhou, D., Dai, Y. Yi, C., Guo, Y. and Zhu, Y.: 2003, 
China’s Sustainable Energy Scenarios in 2020, 
China Environmental Science Press, Beijing, 
August 2003. 
 
